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RECENT CASES
Administrative Law-Applicability of § 5 of the Administrative
Procedure Act to Deportation Proceedings-During a deportation
proceeding, the respondents petitioned for a declaratory decree that they
were entitled to a hearing as prescribed by § 5 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.' That section is applicable to adjudications that are "...
required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for
an agency hearing . . .2 2 The Court granted the petition and enjoined
the defendants from continuing with the procedure adopted by the Attorney
General and the Commissioner of Immigration for deportation proceed-
ings.3  Eisler v. Tom Clark, 77 Fed. Supp. 610 (D. D. C. 1948) .4
Although the Immigration and Naturalization Act is silent as to the
necessity for hearings in deportation proceedings, 5 the Supreme Court on
numerous occasions has stated that to insure due process the statute should
be interpreted to require them.0 Upon the adoption of the Administrative
Procedure Act in 1946, the Immigration Commissioner decided that § 5
of the Act was not applicable to deportation proceedings.7 The Com-
missioner, relying on the legislative history of the Procedure Act, con-
cluded that Congress intended it to apply only where the enabling statute
expressly required a hearing.8 A close examination of the legislative
history of the Act, however, shows that it does not clearly support the
contention of the Commissioner. 9 In fact the overall policy seems to have
been to exclude from § 5 only the great mass of administrative routine
1. 60 STAT. 239 (1946), 5 U. S. C. 1004 (1946). § 5 provides that in every case
of adjudication required by statute to be dtermined on the record after opportunity
for an agency hearing (with certain exceptions) there should be: (a) notice of the
hearing and the issues, (b) opportunity for submission of evidence and arguments, and
(c) separation of functions. §§ 7 and 8 are made to apply.
2. Ibid.
3. 8 CODE Fa. REGS. C. 1 § 19.
4. But cf. Wong Yang Sung v. Clark et al., H. C. 3420 (D. D. C. 1948). The
Court came to the conclusion that § 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act did not
apply to a deportation case. It erroneously based its conclusion on a section of the
enabling statute pertaining to exclusion rather than deportation proceedings.
5. 39 STAT. 889 (1917), as amended, 8 U. S. C. 157 (1940).
6. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454, 464 (1920) ; Japanese Immigrant Case,
189 U. S. 86 (1903).
7. 8 IXMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION MONTHLY REvIEW 103 (1947).
8. Sources for decision were SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 21, 79, 226,
359 (1945).
9. The Attorney General, in a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, objected to
the use of ". . . required by law . . ." in § 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act
as originally proposed in 1941. He suggested that the word "law" be replaced by
. . . statute and constitution .... " because it was desirable to exclude those
agencies which, by regulations, imposed on themselves formal hearings. Hearings
before Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 674, S. 675 and S. 918,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1456 (1941).
The Minority Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure proposed that the Procedure Act as drafted in 1941 be amended specifically
to exclude the Immigration Bureau. The propsal was not adopted. Id. at 1390, 1411.
Similar bills were introduced in the 2d session of the 80th Cong.: H. R. 6652, S. 2755.
In debate in the House the following statement with regard to § 5 was made: "The
requirements of section 5 are thus limited to cases in which statutes otherwise require a
hearing because, where statutes do not require an agency hearing, the parties affected
are entitled to try out the pertinent facts in court ... " 92 CoNG. REc. 5651 (1946).
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for which a hearing was usually not provided by Congress. 10 That depor-
tation proceedings which result ". . . in loss of both property and life,
or of all that makes life worth living . . . " 11 can scarcely be deemed
administrative routine would seem to have been recognized in the circum-
stance that except for the requirement of separation of the trial examiner
from the direct jurisdiction of the agency, 12 prescribed deportation pro-
cedure already complies with the Act.' 3 In proceedings where the Govern-
ment is an interested litigant, however, the reason for separation of functions
applies with full vigor, and the objection that the agency is not actually
the adversary of the party before it 14 has no bearing. The added costs
which compliance with the ruling of the instant case will impose'15 would
seem a small price to pay for assurance that the great purpose of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act 16 will be fulfilled in this important class of
cases.
Administrative Law-Conclusiveness of Agency's Findings Un-
der Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Act-Forty-four years after
the defendant obtained his medical license, the State Board of Medical Edu-
cation and Licensure, after hearing, revoked the license for having been
obtained by false sworn statements regarding his medical education. There
was no charge of malpractice or unethical conduct, and it was admitted
that the defendant had graduated from a medical school and passed the
appropriate state examination. The members of the Board were medical
doctors who devoted only part of their time to this state employment.
Upon conflictirig testimony and fragmentary documents the Board found
as a fact that the defendant had procured the license by fraud. On appeal
from an order of the Common Pleas Court sustaining the revocation, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed and reinstated the license, hold-
ing that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence. The
court stated that their conclusion was drawn from an examination of the
entire record. Pa. State Board of Medical Education and Licensure v.
Schireson, 61 A. 2d 343 (Pa. 1948).
Although the provision of the recently adopted Pennsylvania Adminis-
trative Agency Act 1 that agency findings are to be conclusive on the re-
viewing court if supported by substantial evidence 2 applies at the present
time only to the various less important adjudications for which judicial
review is not specifically provided by another statute,3 a Supreme Court
10. SEN. Doc., supra note 8, at 22.
11. See NG Fung Ho v. White 259 U. S. 276, 284 (1922).
12. 60 STAT. 239 (1946), 5 U. S. C. 1004 (1946).
13. See address by Ugo Carusi reported in 7 N. Y. U. LAW INST. PROC. 296
(1947).
14. 34 GEo. L. J. 407, 424 (1946).
15. H. R. REP. No. 2140, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1948).
16. SEN. Doc., supra note 8, at 1.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1947) tit. 71, §§ 1710.1-1710.51. For a full
survey of the present state of administrative procedure reform in Pennsylvania see
Byse, Administrative Procedure Reform in Pennsylvania, 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 22
(1948).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1947) tit. 71, § 1710.44. For a comprehensive
survey of the history and content of the term, "substantial evidence," see Stason, "Sub-
stantial Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. or PA. L. REv. 1026 (1941).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1947) tit. 71, § 1710.51.
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interpretation of the review authorized is significant because it is contem-
plated to extend the coverage of this act to the more important adjudica-
tions.4 The Federal courts and other jurisdictions have interpreted the
s ame words to mean that the findings are conclusive if the evidence is such
that a reasonable man would accept it as adequate to support the con-
clusion.5 Thus, the standard by which findings are measured is sub-
jective, and disagreement between courts and judges of the same court
is to be expected. 6  Application of the standard to specific cases allows
large discretion, but requires considerable self-restraint to avoid both
broadening the scope of review to a weighing of evidence and substitution
of a "correct" finding for that of the agency,7 or narrowing the scope to
a requirement only that a bare minimum of evidence support the findings.
8
Perhaps through fear that the Pennsylvania court would adopt too narrow
a review by examining only the evidence supporting the facts found, and
determining whether it alone was sufficient, an amendment has been sug-
gested to require the evidence to be substantial "in view of the entire
record." 9 Common sense alone would require that evidence supporting
the findings should not be appraised in isolation from contrary evidence,
and substantial evidence has already been generally acknowledged to mean
substantial in light of the entire record. 10  An equally legitimate appre-
hension would have been that the court would adopt too broad a scope of
review and upset findings which, though reasonable, were not conclusions
the court would have reached on the same evidence.
Since the court in the instant case overturned findings previously
concurred in by an agency and a court," the decision should put to rest
any fear that the court will adopt too narrow a scope of review for the
safety of private parties. The amendment as proposed is unnecessary,
since the court stated that it considered the entire record, 12 and, more
important, found the Board's evidence insubstantial largely because of
conflicting positive testimony by the defendant's witness. Conversely, the
decision does not mean that the court has adopted too broad a scope of
4. Report of the Section on Administrative Law, 19 PA. B. A. Q. 386, 388 (1948).
See Byse, op. cit. supra note 1, at 31.
5. E. g, Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 229 (1938) ; Mat-
ter of Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282 N. Y. 256, 26 N. E. 2d 247 (1940).
6. See Shine, Administrative Procedure Act: Judicial Review "Hotchpot"?, 36
GEo. L. J. 16, 31 (1947). The dissenting opinion in the instant case expressed satis-
faction that the evidence was substantial. Compare the review of evidence in the
majority opinion with that of the lower court which also found the evidence substan-
tial. State Board v. Schireson, 59 Dauphin Co. 140 (Pa. 12 Jud. Dist. July 14, 1948).
7. See Stason, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1037. Although the power to "weigh" the
evidence is said to permit a larger instrusion into the fact realm, the distinction is
elusive, one which judges and lawyers "feel." See Jaffe, Administrative Procedure
Re-examined: The Benjamin Report, 56 HAgv. L. REv. 704, 728 (1943).
8. See Stason, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1036.
9. Report of the Section on Administrative Law, 19 PA. B. A. Q. 386, 387 (1948).
See Byse, op. cit. supra note 1, at 41. There is language in a recent Superior Court
opinion which seems to approve examining only the evidence supporting the findings.
See Stillman Unemployment Case, 161 Pa. Super. Ct. 569, 575, 56 A. 2d 380, 382, 383
(1948).
10. Matter of Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282 N. Y. 256, 274, 26 N. E. 2d
247, 255 (1940). Byse, op. cit. supra note 1, at 94.
11. See Black, J., dissenting in N. L. R. B. v. Columbia Enameling Co., 306 U. S.
292, 304 (1939).
12. Instant case at 347.
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review. Where, as here, the agency is composed of part time members,
the fact question is not one which the Board is better trained to find than
the court,13 innocence is presumed from the passage of many years, the
charge is not serious and the result is to deprive one of a valuable right,
all the inarticulate factors 14 which help to determine the conclusiveness
of the findings demand a thorough examination of the evidence, such as
was made in this case. The extensive intrusion into the fact realm by the
court was justified by facts peculiar to the instant case 15 and would not
seem to show an intention to establish the court as a super administrative
board through the substantial evidence provision.
Army and Navy--The Status of Adopted Brothers and Sisters
as Beneficiaries Under the National Service Life Insurance Act of
1940-Plaintiff, upon the death of his adopted sister, sued as
beneficiary of her N. S. L. I. policy. The Government, maintaining that
an adoptive brother did not come within the permitted class of beneficiaries,'
brought in insured's husband, the originally-designated beneficiary, as ad-
verse claimant. He contended that there had been no effective change of
beneficiary since plaintiff was ineligible under the statute. The District
Court ruled that the Government's assertion was correct. On appeal,
though the judgment was reversed on other grounds, this ruling was
affirmed. Woodward v. United States, 167 F. 2d 774 (8th Cir. 1948).
In a similar case, insured, deceased, had named his adoptive parents
as beneficiaries. When they died before payments under the policy were
completed, plaintiff, their natural daughter, claimed the remainder. The
section of the Act which lists those who may receive such payments 2 in-
cludes "sister" but makes no reference to persons standing in this relation-
ship to the insured solely through adoption. Judgment was given for de-
fendant when the court decided that Congress did not intend that an
adoptive sister should come within the connotation of this term. This
decision was held erroneous by the appellate court. Carpenter v. United
States, 168 F. 2d 369 (3d Cir. 1948).
13. Where legislative policy is involved in the factual determination the finding
is more conclusive on the court. Cole v. Pa. P. U. C., 146 Pa. Super. Ct. 257, 22 A. 2d
121 (1941). See Modern Transfer Co. v. Pa. P. U. C., 139 Pa. Super. Ct. 197, 202,
12 A. 2d 458, 461 (1937).
14. See FINA.L REPORT Ar'y GEN. Comm. AD. PROC. 91 (1941).
15. Even where the language of statutory limitations on the scope of review
varies it can only be guessed how much the judges' actual treatment differs. Cf. FINAL
REPORr ATr'y GEN. Comm. AD. PRoc. 89-90 (1941).
1. 54 STAT. 1010 (1940), as amended, 56 STAT. 659 (1942), 60 STAT. 782 (1946),
38 U. S. C. § 802(g) (1946), which determines the permitted class, provides: "The in-
surance shall be payable only to a widow, widower, child (including a stepchild or an
illegitimate child if designated as beneficiary by the insured), parent, brother or sister
of the insured. The insured shall have the right to designate the beneficiary or bene-
ficiaries of the insurance, but only within the class herein provided ..
2. 54 STAT. 1010 (1940), 38 U. S. C. § 802(h) (3) : "Any installments certain of
insurance remaining unpaid at the death of any benficiary shall be paid in equal monthly
installments in an amount equal to the installments paid to the first beneficiary, to
the person or persons then in being within the class hereafter specified and in the
order named, unless designated by the insured in a different order . . . (D) if no
widow, widower, child or parent, to the brothers and sisters of the insured, if living,
in equal shares."
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While the war-risk insurance of World War I was explicitly made
payable to adopted brothers and sisters of the insured serviceman,3 the
N. S. L. I. Act provides merely that payments under the policies it au-
thorizes may be made to a "brother or sister." 4 The absence of con-
gressional definition of these words gave rise to the contradiction expressed
in these two cases. When Congress first determined that the Government
should insure the lives of members of the armed forces, it established a
restricted class of beneficiaries in order to permit receipt of the benefits of
that insurance only by persons having a "moral right" to them.5 The
question whether Congress intended adopted brothers and sisters to be
outside this category when the N. S. L. I. Act was enacted has been
judicially considered six times.6  Five courts7 gave affirmative answers.8
The principal basis for these decisions was found in the fact that while
all the other terms of the Act which ordinarily denote blood relationships
are defined and given broad meanings, "brother" and "sister" remain un-
defined. 9 This omission, it was concluded, clearly evidenced an intention
to make the narrow dictionary definition' ° applicable. However, the
appellate court in the Carpenter case refused so to construe the congres-
sional silence. It declared that Congress probably had never been con-
sciously aware of the omission. The Act had been referred to committees I,
unfamiliar with this type legislation, and had been presented with the con-
troversial Revenue Act of 1940; 12 it had never received the close con-
sideration presumed by the other courts. In related legislation,13 in the
amendments to the Act,'4 and in the sociological view of adoption as "social
3. 43 STAT. 624 (1924), 38 U. S. C. § 511 provides that: ". . . Yearly renew-
able term insurance shall be payable only to a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, brother,
sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law, or to any or all of
them. . . ." 43 STAT. 607 (1924), 38 U. S. C. § 424 states: "(6) The terms 'brother'
and 'sister' include brothers and sisters of the half blood as well as those of the whole
blood, stepbrothers and stepsisters, and brothers and sisters through adoption."
4. See note 1 supra.
5. See Hearings before Conmnittee on World War Veteran's Legislation on H. R.
4963, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
6. In addition to the two cases here commented on (cited in text) were: Droney
v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 154 (D. D. C. 1945) ; Beach v. United States, Civil No.
21,770, N. D. Ohio, April 5, 1946; and the instant cases in the District Courts, Wood-
ward v. United States, Civil No. 615, W. D. Mo. January 6, 1947, and Carpenter v.
United States, 72 F. Supp. 510 (W. D. Pa. 1947).
7. See cases cited in note 6; omitting Carpenter v. United States in the Circuit
Court of Appeals (citation in text).
8. This agreed with Administrator's Decision, Veterans' Administration, No. 514
(March 10, 1943).
9. 54 STAT. 1008 (1940), as amended, 56 STAT. 659 (1942), 60 STAT. 781 (1946),
38 U. S. C. § 801 (1946).
10. Bouvsua's LAW DicrioARY (Rawle's Revision): "He (she) who is born
from the same father and mother, or from one of them only."
11. The Ways and Means Committee in the House of Representatives and the
Senate Finance Committee.
12. 54 STAT. 516 (1940), 26 U. S. C. § 1 (1946). This Act, which included pro-
visions for excess profits taxes, was the subject of much debate.
13. 56 STAT. 385 (1942), as amended, 57 STAT. 580 (1943), 37 U. S. C. § 220(f)
(1946), which authorized monthly allotments payable to dependents of servicemen;
including adopted brothers and sisters.
14. 54 STAT. 1008 (1940), as amended, 56 STAT. 659 (1942), 60 STAT. 781 (1946),
38 U. S. C. § 801. This section of the Act originally had subsections to (e) : however,
by 56 STAT. 659 (1942), subsection (f) was added. This first read: "The term
'parent,' 'father,' and 'mother' include a father, mother, father through adoption, mother
through adoption, persons who have stood in loco parentis to a member of the military
or naval forces at any time prior to the entry into active service for a period of not
less than one year." By 60 STAT. 781, the following clause was added to subsection
(f) : ". . . and a stepparent, if designated as beneficiary by the insured."
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birth," it found persuasive indicia of a belief of Congress that adopted
brothers and sisters were entitled to these benefits.
The presence of an adverse claimant with great sympathetic appeal
may have affected the decision in the Woodward case. Likewise, in the
Carpenter case, the plaintiff was possibly aided by the fact that, had the
Government received judgment, the proceeds would have remained un-
claimed.' 5  However, the result in this latter case seems more likely to
reflect the true legislative intent. It has been shown 18 that Congress has
already reacted to the current trend toward regarding the adoptee as a
member of his adoptive family in every respect.17 It seems therefore ap-
parent that in designating the class of persons of sufficiently close relation-
ship to the insured to qualify as beneficiaries, it intended to include adopted
brothers and sisters. Since the definitive answer to this question is a
matter of great importance, the legislative action required '8 should be
taken, and, if the answer is to be consistent with past enactments, it will
place adopted brothers and sisters within the permitted class.
Constitutional Law-Exclusion of Public from Courtroom Vio-
lates Right to Public Trial-At the commencement of a trial for
transporting persons for purposes of prostitution, the court, over the ac-
cused's objection, ordered that all "except those actually engaged in the
trial of this case" leave the room. On appeal from conviction, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma reversed on the ground that this order denied the
accused his constitutional right to a public trial.' Neal v. State, 192 P. 2d
294 (Okla. 1948).
The Sixth Amendment and the vast majority of state constitutions 2
expressly grant the right to a public trial. The problem of whether there
has been compliance with the constitutional requirement customarily arises
where there is to be disgusting or immoral testimony. It is well-settled
that counsel, relatives, friends, or press may never be excluded; 3 and that,
on the other hand, exclusion of the general public is proper to prevent
15. 54 STAT. 1011 (1940), 38 U. S. C. §802(j) states: "No installments of such
insurance shall be paid to the heirs or legal representatives as such of the insured or
of any beneficiary, and in the event that no person within the permitted class survives
to receive the insurance or any part thereof, no payment of the unpaid installments
shall be made."
16. See notes 3 and 13 supra.
17. See Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession By and From the Adopted Child, 28
WASH. U. L. Q. 221 (1943) for an excellent analysis of the adoption statutes of forty-
nine jurisdictions. The rule of Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Kenney, 240 U. S. 489
(1916) cannot be employed here to make these statutes controlling in the interpreta-
tion of the N. S. L. I. Act, since, the policies being contracts to which the Government
is a party (see United States v. Williams, 302 U. S. 46, 50 (1937) and United States
v. Zazove, 334 U. S. 602, 611n (1948)) their construction is purely a matter for Fed-
eral Law. United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U. S. 174, 183 (1944).
18. Since certiorari has been applied for in neither of the instant cases, no final
judicial determination of this problem in the immediate future is indicated.
1. OKLA. CoNST. Art. II, § 20.
2. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Virginia, and Wyoming have neither consti-
tutional nor statutory requirements that a trial be public. Massachusetts has by im-
plication recognized this right, since MAss. GEN. LAWS 1932, c. 278, § 16A gives the
court discretion to exclude in specified cases.
3. In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 271 (1948) ; State v. Beckstead, 96 Utah 528, 88
P. 2d 461 (1939).
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overcrowding, 4 or to quell disorder. 5  The main controversy has arisen
over the right of the court to exclude the general public for other reasons.
Courts holding that the exclusion of mere spectators denied defendant a
public trial have variously rested their decisions on the ground that some
reluctant witness might come forward on hearing the testimony; 6 that
the presence of the public was necessary to insure justice being done; 7
that the public had a right to see its courts in action.8 Implicit in these
decisions is the fear that any exclusion will transform the court into a
Star Chamber. Such a fear seems groundless where relatives, friends, and
press are not excluded." Justifications for the exclusion of the general
public have been that in morals trials popular opinion will usually run
strongly against the accused, and may exert a prejudicial influence upon
the jury; 10 that public morals are adversely affected by exposure to sordid
evidence;" and that the administration of justice is handicapped by the
inability of timid witnesses to relate their shame before the prurient gaze of
idle spectators.1
2
In the instant case, the order excluding all "except those actually
engaged in the trial of this case" is ambiguous as to the status of relatives,
friends, and press. Regardless of judicial intention, the active connotation
of the word "engaged" probably led those parties to withdraw, and there-
fore reversal was clearly consonant with established principles. However,
the Supreme Court does not single out as error the exclusion of essential
parties, but rather, states that exclusion of the general public will only be
tolerated under exceptional circumstances. 13 Such a decision, though
amply supported by precedent, is open to criticism as perpetuating a rule
-which looks not to the substance of protecting the interests of all parties
involved, but instead, emphasizes the dry literal meaning of a public trial.
A rule whereby in a morals trial the court has discretion to bar the general
public if, in its opinion, the accused would not be prejudiced seems prefer-
able as striking an equitable balance between the right of the accused to
have present those who can be of aid to him, and the necessity of pro-
tecting innocent witnesses from shame and the general public from degrad-
ing filth.' 4
4. Tate v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 685, 80 S. W. 2d 817 (1935).
5. State v. Genese, 102 N. J. L. 134, 130 Atl. 642 (1925).
6. Tanksley v. United States, 145 F. 2d 58 (9th Cir. 1944). The dissenting opin-
ion rejected this as an historical reason for the requirement of a public trial. Id. at 62.
7. Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394 (8th Cir. 1917) ; Rhoades v. State, 102 Neb.
750, 169 N. W. 433 (1918). But cf. Commonwealth v. Principatti, 260 Pa. 587, 598,
104 Atl. 53, 57 (1918) (exclusion held proper where witness feared vengeance hence
refused to testify before spectators).
8. State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 156 P. 1080 (1916). The dissenting opinion
points out that the concept of a public trial was formed in a day when stenographers
and newspapers were virtually unknown. Id. at 221, 156 P. at 1084.
9. See Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L. Q. 381, 386 (1931), where
the author contends that secrecy was not characteristic of Star Chamber procedure.
10. See Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 461, 172 P. 273, 274 (1918).
11. People v. Hall, 51 App. Div. 57, 64 N. Y. Supp. 433 (4th Dep't 1900); 6
WIGMoPA, EVIDENCE § 1835 (3d ed. 1940).
12. Moore v. State, 151 Ga. 648, 108 S. E. 47 (1921); State v. Callahan, 100
Minn. 63, 110 N. W. 342 (1907). For legislative recognition of this problem see
Miss. CoNsT. Art. III, § 26, and UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-7-2 (1943), whereby specta-
tors may be excluded in certain morals trials.
13. Instant case at 296. The court's selection of authority further indicates its
adoption of the strict construction of a public trial.
14. See State v. Beckstead, 96 Utah 528, 539, 88 P. 2d 461, 466 (1939) (concur-
ring opinion).
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Constitutional Law-Privileges and Immunities-State Statute
Regulating Fishing in Marginal Sea Held Unconstitutional-Plain-
tiffs, non-residents of South Carolina, brought suit to enjoin enforcement
of a statute 1 of that state which virtually excluded non-residents from com-
mercial shrimp fishing in the three-mile maritime belt off South Carolina.2
The district court denied the injunction, but on direct appeal to the Su-
preme Court, was reversed. The Court held that a state must exercise its
power to regulate fishing in the marginal sea in a manner consistent with
the Constitution, and that commercial shrimp fishing in the marginal sea
is within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause, Art. IV,
Sec. 2. Since there was no reasonable relationship between the danger
represented by non-resident shrimpers 3 and the severe discrimination
practiced upon them, this statute violated that clause.4 Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U. S. 385 (1948).
The long recognized power of the states to regulate the taking of wild
game within its borders, including the marginal sea,3 has had two bases:
(1) that it is an exercise of the police power, and (2) that the state is
acting as a "trustee" of the common property of its citizens. On either or
both of these theories, anca against contentions that it violated the due
process, equal protection, privileges and immunities, and commerce clauses
of the Constitution, state legislation regulating and taxing the taking 6 and
canning 7 of game, prohibiting its taking altogether 8 or its transportation
out of the state, 9 and discriminating against non-residents, 10 or resident
aliens," has been upheld. Although there is no direct precedent con-
trolling this case, the language of McCready v. Virginia 12 as interpreted
by numerous cases following it,'3 tends to support the South Carolina
statute. The McCready case, in upholding a Virginia statute prohibiting
non-residents from planting oysters in a Virginia tidewater river, did so
on the theory that animals ferae naturae are the common property of all
the citizens of the state; the state is a kind of trustee exercising this
1. S. C. CODE, § 3379 (1942), as amended in S. C. Acts of 1947, Act 281, § 1. (It
required non-residents to pay an annual license fee of $2500 per boat, residents only
$25.)
2. S. C. CODE, § 3414 (1942), which required licensed shrimpers to dock, unload,
pack and stamp (with tax stamps) their catch at a South Carolina port before ship-
ment to another state, was also challenged, and held a violation of the commerce clause.
3. Instant case at 397 and note 30 thereon.
4. Justices Frankfurter and Black, in separate opinion, thought the majority mis-
applied the privileges and immunities clause but concurred in result on grounds that
this statute violated the commerce clause.
5. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U. S. 69 (1941) ; cf. The Abbey Dodge, 223 U. S. 166
(1912).
6. Lacoste v. Dept. of Conservation, 263 U. S. 545 (1924) (commerce) ; Silz
v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S. 31 (1908) (due process and commerce) ; Manchester v.
Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240 (1891) (commerce).
7. Bayside Fish Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422 (1936) (commerce); Van Camp
v. Dept. Natural Resources, 30 F. 2d 111 (S. D. Cal. 1929) (commerce).
8. Thomson v. Dana, 52 F. 2d 759 (Ore. 1931) (commerce).
9. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519 (1896) (commerce) ; Rupert v. United
States, 181 F. 87 (8th Cir. 1910).
10. Haavik v. Alaska Packers Assn., 263 U. S. 510 (1924) (equal protection);
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391 (1876) (privileges and immunities and equal pro-
tection) ; In re Eberle, 98 F. 295 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1899) (privileges and immunities).
11. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 (1914) (equal protection).
12. 94 U. S. 391 (1876).
13. See Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1, 52 (1906); Geer v. Connecticut,
supra note 9 at 529.
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ownership for the benefit of its citizens. Non-residents have no such
property interest and the privileges and immunities clause does not entitle
them to it. The Court distinguishes the instant case on the ground that
here the statute relates to the marginal sea, and to migratory, free-
swimming fish, to which the ownership idea does not apply.
While this decision apparently merely limits the ownership theory of
the McCready case by refusing to extend it to fish in the marginal sea, it
is possible that it may also no longer apply to game in other state territory.
The property theory is now considered merely a fiction, the sovereign
power to regulate game being actually a part of the police power,14 the
source of which is the duty of the state to preserve and regulate the ex-
ploitation of a valuable resource. 15 This is shown by an analysis of recent
cases, where each time state game regulation has been found not to be an
honest conservation measure, it has been declared unconstitutional.' 6
Although none of these involve the privileges and immunities clause, they
tend to refute the "ownership" idea which is the basis for the proposition
that the right to take animals ferae naturae is not guaranteed by that
clause. The case of Takahashi v. California,"' however, decided the same
day as the instant case, indicates that the Courf may intend to maintain the
distinction first adopted in the instant case between the extent of state
control over fish in the marginal sea and state control over game in other
parts of the state.
Constitutional Law-Stockholder's Derivative Suit--Statute Re-
quiring Security for Defendant's Expenses Held Valid-Appellant
brought a minority stockholder's derivative suit against corporate officers
and directors, charging waste and mismanagement. In accordance with
the requirements of § 61-b, New York General Corporation Law,' the
trial court ordered him to give security for the payment of defendant's
expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, in the event of a successful
defense. Following dismissal of the complaint for failure to obey the
14. Instant case at 402; POUND, AN INTRoDUc'IO TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW,
197-202.
15. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 434 (1920) ; Geer v. Connecticut, supra
at 535.
16. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1 (1928) (commerce);
Pavel v. Richard, 28 F. Supp. 992 (W. D. La. 1938) (equal protection); Pavel v.
Pattison, 24 F. Supp. 915 (W. D. La. 1938) (equal protection); see Thomson v.
Dana, supra note 8 at 762; Van Camp v. Dept. Natural Resources, supra note 7 at
113.
17. 334 U. S. 410 (1948). Here the Court held that California's ownership of
the fish in the marginal sea was not adequate to justify a statute prohibiting resident
Japanese aliens from fishing there commercially. The court apparently did not over-
rule cases upholding similar discrimination regarding hunting and fishing in the in-
terior, viz. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, supra note 11; Lubetich v. Pollock, 6 F. 2d 237
(W. D. Wash. 1925).
1. "61-b. Security for expenses. In any action . . . in the right of any for-
eign or domestic corporation by the holder . . . of less than five per centum of the
outstanding shares of any class . . ., unless the shares . . . have a market value
in excess of fifty thousand dollars, the corporation . . . shall be entitled . . . to
require the plaintiff . . . to give security for the reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, which may be incurred by it in connection with such action and by the
other parties defendant in connection therewith for which it may become subject pur-
suant to section sixty-four of this chapter, to which the corporation shall have recourse
in such amount as the court having jurisdiction shall determine upon the termination
of such action. . . ." Laws 1945, c. 869, § 3. By § 64 successful defendants are given
the right to assess their expenses against the corporation.
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order, a direct appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, solely to deter-
mine the constitutionality of the statute. The court held unanimously that
the statute was valid, and consistent with the due process and equal pro-
tection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 Lapckak v. Baker, 80
N. E. 2d 751 (N. Y. 1948).
The only fact which the court chose to notice judicially was the con-
ceded existence of abuses of the derivative suit.
3 The resulting barrenness
of the record, coupled with the presumption in favor of the constitutionality
of legislation, allowed the court to assume that the statute was reasonably
related to the evil, and that it created a reasonable classification. 4 While
this method of upholding the constitutionality of legislation has been em-
ployed before,5 other cases have grounded decision on an affirmative show-
ing of the reasonableness of the measure in question. 6 Since merely
showing that a statute is detrimental to a private interest does not in itself
rebut the presumption of constitutionality, 7 a court can often employ either
method. When the situation seems to call for caution, it can refuse to
declare a statute invalid, although refraining from any recognition of the
existence of facts which in themselves justify the legislative action. On
the other hand, a declaration of unconstitutionality requires the elabora-
tion of a firm factual basis to show the unreasonableness of the provision.
It may not be safe to generalize further than to state that judicial willing-
ness to declare legislation unconstitutional on the basis of facts judicially
noticed bears an inverse relation to the complexity of considerations.,
Section 61-b and several other statutes 9 were adopted to discourage
so-called "strike" suits. Opposition to it, conceding the evil, has been
2. Statutes requiring payment of the other party's attorney's fees have applied
almost always to insurers and common carriers resisting claims unsuccessfully. Gen-
erally such provisions have been upheld, but the differences in relevant considerations
make these cases of doubtful application here. See, e. g., Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mc-
Cray, 291 U. S. 566 (1934); Dohany v. Rogers, 28L U. S. 362, 368 (1930) (con-
demnation by railroad) ; Ahmed's Case, 278 Mass. 180, 179 N. E. 684 (1932) (appeal
by insurer from award of workmen's compensation). But see St. Louis, Iron Mt. &
So. Ry. v. Wynne, 224 U. S. 354, 360 (1912) (holding statute invalid as preventing
resistance to excessive claims). The Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C.
§ 15 (1946), allows attorney's fees in anti-trust actions.
3. "In recent years a veritable racket of baseless lawsuits . . . has grown up
in this field. . . . Secret settlements-really pay-offs for silence-have been the
subjects of common suspicion." Memorandum of Governor Dewey on approving § 61-b
(PUBLIC PAPERS OF GOVERNOR DEWEY, 1944, p. 255), quoted by the court in the instant
case, at 753. See Weinberger v. Quinn, 264 App. Div. 405, 409, 35 N. Y. Supp. 2d 567,
572 (1st Dept. 1942).
4. These are the classic requirements of due process and equal protection as ap-
plied to the police power of the state. See Borden's Farm Prod. Co. v. Baldwin, 293
U. S. 194, 209 (1934) ; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 525 (1934).
5. E. g., O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251, 258 (1931);
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 685 (1888).
6. E. g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 421 (1908). The Court has also re-
manded cases for additional findings of fact. Borden's Farm Prod. Co. v. Baldwin,
293 U. S. 194, 210 (1934) ; Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543, 548-549 (1924).
7. See Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, 364 (1916). For general
discussion of the presumption of constitutionality, see Note, 36 COL. L. REV. 283
(1936).
8. Compare Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886) (statute held unconsti-
tutional because it gave arbitrary power to withhold licenses for laundry business)
with Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 113 (1911). See East New York
Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U. S. 230, 234 (1945).
9. § 61, N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW, requires ownership of stock at time transaction
complained of occurred or devolvement upon plaintiff thereafter by operation of law;
§ 64, N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW, provides for indemnity of corporate officers and directors
by the corporation; § 48, subd. 8, N. Y. CiV. PRAcT. AcT, shortens the period of lim-
itations.
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vigorously articulate 10 on the ground that its practical effect is to prohibit
the bringing of derivative suits in behalf of corporations with widely-held
shares." It is also claimed that the abuse has been controlled effectively
by two decisions, subsequent to the legislation, prohibiting settlements in
which the corporation does not share.12 While there has been controversy
over the net monetary value to corporations of recoveries in successful
derivative suits,13 there is judicial Support for the position that the prophy-
lactic value of the suit has been considerable, and that it represents the
only civil remedy generally available to the minority stockholder.' The
substitute suggestion has been made that effective control of intra-corporate
abuses requires a bureaucratic solution.:5 In the several other states
which have enacted statutes similar to § 61-b,' 6 among them Pennsylvania,
the question of constitutionality has not yet been decided by courts of last
resort. In view of the traditional importance of the derivative suit, a
conclusive test in the Supreme Court of the United States is highly
desirable.
Constitutional Law-Wage Payment Statute Held Not Violative
of Constitutional Provision Forbidding Imprisonment for Debt Ex-
cept in Cases of Fraud-The Labor Code of California makes it a
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for any person "having the
ability to pay, wilfully" to refuse "to pay wages due and payable when
demanded."' Convicted and imprisoned for violation of the statute, peti-
tioner, in habeas corpus proceedings, contended that the statute was con-
10. Zlinkoff, The American Investor and the Constitutionality of Section 61-B of
the New York General Corporation Law, 54 YALE L. J. 352 (1945) ; Hornstein, The
Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 123
(1944).
11. In 1937, only 4% of common stockholders and 4.5% of preferred stockholders
of 1710 dominant corporations held interests totalling $10,000 or more in market value.
GRANBY, SURVEY OF SHAREHOLDINGS IN 1710 CORORATIONS WITHI SEcUmrnns LISTED
ON A NATIONAL SEcuurms EXCHANGE (TNEC Monograph 30, 1941). The Third
Circuit has held § 61-b binding on the federal courts. Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan
Corp., 99 LEGAL INTELLIGENcER 70 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 1948).
12. Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U. S. 204, 212 (1945); Clarke v. Greenberg, 296
N. Y. 146, 71 N. E. 2d 443 (1947) (requiring recipient of "private" settlement to
account to corporation as fiduciary).
13. See Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COL. L.
REV. 1, 15-19 (1947); WooD, SURVEY & REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVA-
TiVE SUITS (Special Committee on Corporate Litigation of the Chamber of Commerce
of the State of New York, 1944) 83, cited in Brief for Respondent, p. 14.
14. See Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 49 N. Y. Supp. 2d 64, 71 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ; Bayer
v. Beran, 49 N. Y. Supp. 2d 2, 4 (Sup. Ct. 1944). In N. Y., the attorney-general
may bring an action in behalf of the people of the state. § 61 N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW.
15. Hornstein, A New Forum for Stockholders, 45 COL. L. REv. 35 (1945).
Hornstein, Legal Controls for Intracorporate Abuse-Present and Future, 41 COL. L.
REv. 405, 448-456 (1941). As to the work of the SEC, see Purcell et al., Enforcing
the Accountability of Corporate Management and Related Activities of S. E. C., 32
VA. L. REv. 497 (1946).
16. Pennsylvania: Act of April 18, 1945, P. L. 114, PENNA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12,
§ 1322 (Purdon, Supp. 1947) (requiring 5% ownership); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE,
Art. 16, § 195 (Supp. 1947) (requiring 5% ownership or $25,000 market value and
excluding attorneys' fees); New Jersey: N. J. STAT. ANN., § 14:3-15 (Supp. 1947)
(substantially same as N. Y. statute) ; Wisconsin: Wis. STAT., § 180.13, subd. 3 (19th
ed., 1947) (requiring 5% ownership unless personal benefit was received by defend-
ants).
1. CALIF. LABOR CODE § 216 (Deering, 1943).
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trary to the California constitutional provision which forbids imprisonment
for debt except in cases of fraud.2  The Supreme Court of California
upheld the statute since, because of the nature of wages, the elements of
the misdemeanor amount to fraud within the meaning and purpose of the
California constitution. Ex parte Trombley, 193 P. 2d 734 (Calif. 1948).
An enlightened attitude toward poor but honest debtors languishing
in prison and a desire to remove from the public the burden of their
families' subsistence led to restrictions against imprisonment for debt in
most state constitutions.8 Such imprisonment normally resulted from
common law civil actions; ' but the constitutional safeguards have been
interpreted to invalidate legislation which made nonpayment of a debt a
crime punishable by imprisonment.5 In construing the usual formulation
(forbidding imprisonment for debt except in cases of fraud) courts, to
discover fraud, have looked at the circumstances surrounding nonpayment
of the debt as well as to those out of which the obligation arose., The
problem of the instant case falls within the former category; but the hold-
ing of constitutionality is unprecedented in that the statute involved does
not require, in terms, either fraud or a fraudulent intent7
Imprisonment is a sanction employed to protect a strong public in-
terest and operates both as a punishment of the malfeasant and as a de-
terrent to others against future conduct of the same nature. Absent
ability to pay, mere nonpayment of a contractual obligation does not justify
imprisonment. That this is so is indicated by the fact that insolvency
proceedings normally entail no penal consequences, and that modern busi-
ness maintains contingency funds to offset uncollectible obligations; non-
payment is an accepted business risk. Judgment debts arising ex delicto
likewise do not require imprisonment, for there the law provides sanctions
2. CALIF. CoNsT. ART. I, § 15: "No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil
action, on mesne or final process, unless in cases of fraud, nor in civil actions for torts,
except in cases of wilfull injury to person or property ..
The issue of constitutionality arose because, although in terms the prohibition
extends only to civil actions, "the power to prescribe punishment in a criminal case
may not be used to defeat the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment for debt.
Accordingly . . . the validity of the statute under which petitioner was convicted
must be tested in the light of the constitutional provision." Instant case at 737.
3. Thirty-nine states have such prohibitions. Note, 41 HAgv. L. REv. 786 (1928).
Other states have achieved similar results through legislation.
4. For a discussion of imprisonment for debt at common law and use of writs of
capias ad respondendum and capias ad satisfaciendum see Ford, Imprisonment for Debt,
25 Mica. L. REv. 24 (1926).
5. E. g., People v. Holder, 53 Calif. App. 45, 199 Pac. 832 (1921) (statute mak-
ing punishable by imprisonment without proof of fraud the appropriation of money
paid to a building contractor for any use other than payment of certain debts) ; In re
Crane, 26 Calif. App. 22, 145 Pac. 733 (1914) (statute similar to that of the instant
case but not requiring the ability to pay or wilful refusal) ; Melconian v. City of Grand
Rapids, 218 Mich. 397, 188 N. W. 521 (1922) (city ordinance making punishable by
imprisonment refusal to pay taxi fare without proof of fraud) ; State v. Prudential
Coal Co., 130 Tenn. 275, 170 S. W. 56 (1914) (statute making punishable by imprison-
ment the wilful non-payment of wages) ; cf. Waldron v. Olsen, 81 N. J. L. 326, 79
Atl. 1061 (1911) (statute permitting the court to enforce by imprisonment a money
decree on judgment debt in absence of fraud).
6. See, e. g., Gault v. Gault, 112 N. J. Eq. 41, 163 Atl. 139, 140 (1932) ; Clark v.
State, 171 Ind. 104, 107, 84 N. E. 984, 985 (1908).
7. ". . . if the act denounced is itself fraudulent, that is, one which necessarily
accomplishes a fraud, then it is unnecessary that the statute contain an express pro-
vision requiring an intent to defraud." Instant case at 740.
For a productive analysis of statutes requiring bimonthly pay days in the light of
the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt, see Smith, The Consti-
tutionality of Bimonthly Pay Day Laws, 16 TENN. L. Rxv. 940 (1941).
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against the underlying conduct if it is serious enough to be criminal. How-
ever, fraud in the creation or refusal to discharge debts is recognized in
most constitutions as justifying imprisonment regardless of ability to pay.8
Where, under the constitution, fraud must be present to uphold the statute,
the difficult question is not whether the statute in terms requires fraud
but whether the elements of the misdemeanor defined by the statute of
necessity amount to fraud. Fraud in the refusal to discharge a debt would
seem clearly to require ability to pay, and the absence of a bona fide con-
tention of the debtor as to the validity of the debt. In the absence of an
express requirement of fraud, therefore, it would seem sufficient to uphold
the constitutionality of the statute, that there be the ability to pay, wilful
refusal, and, as in the instant case, such circumstances surrounding the
refusal to pay that imprisonment is justified.
Courts-Martial-Liability of Reenlisted Serviceman for Offenses
Committed in Previous Enlistment-After having spent three years
as a Japanese prisoner of war in the Philippine Islands, the relator was
liberated in September 1945 and returned to the United States. He was
honorably discharged from the U. S. Navy on March 26, 1946 by reason
of the expiration of his enlistment; the following day he reenlisted for a
period of four years. Charges that he had mistreated fellow prisoners on
named occasions were preferred against him in February 1947. A gen-
eral court-martial found him guilty on two specifications, and he was
sentenced to be reduced from Chief Petty Officer to Apprentice Seaman,
to serve ten months' confinement, and to be dishonorably discharged from
the service. When a subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
granted by the District Court and he was ordered released' the Navy
appealed. In reversing the judgment of the lower court the Second Cir-
cuit said 2 that relator was amenable to trial by court-martial inasmuch
as he was subject to its process not only at the time when the offenses
were committed but also at the time when the trial took place and juris-
diction thus obtained was not destroyed by an intervening honorable dis-
charge.3  The decision was affirmed on rehearing. United States ex rel.
Hirshberg v. Malanaphy, 168 F. 2d 503 (2d Cir. 1948).
Early characterization of military tribunals as courts of limited juris-
diction 4 firmly established the right of collateral attack on the jurisdiction
of such bodies by means of habeas corpus proceedings instituted in the
civil courts.5 While the Congress has defined in general terms the nature
8. This is true in twenty-six state constitutions. See note 3 stpra.
1. United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Malanaphy, 73 F. Supp. 990 (E. D. N. Y.
1947).
2. Frank, Circuit Judge, dissented.
3. In holding that an honorable discharge did not operate as a pardon, the court
said that the broad language of United States v. Kelley, 15 Wall. 34 (U. S. 1872) to
the effect that an honorable discharge was a formal final judgment passed by the gov-
ernment upon the entire military record of the soldier had been restricted by United
States v. Landers, 92 U. S. 77 (1875). For a pragmatic discussion of the efficacy of
mass-produced documents issued by local commanders see Hironimus v. Durant, 168
F. 2d 288 (4th Cir. 1948). It would seem that such certificates should be at most
prima facie evidence of the character of the dischargee and the nature of his service.
4. Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 330 (U. S. 1806).
5. Ibid.; Ex Parte Watkins, 3 Peters 193 (U. S. 1830).
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and extent of the military process,6 particularization under these broad
statutes is obtained by official interpretations in the form of regulations
or instructions which, when approved by the President, are issued by the
Secretaries of the several services.7 Following this procedure, the Navy
had rules for seventy years that under the provisions of the Articles for the
Government of the Navy court-martial jurisdiction terminated upon sepa-
ration from the service 8 and such jurisdiction was not revived as to
offenses committed in a prior enlistment by a subsequent reentry into the
naval service. 9 The most important issue 10 presented by the instant case
centers around the purported reversal of this interpretation in 1938.11 In
upholding this action, the court said that either position was equally tenable
under the broad provisions of the statute.12 The validity of such a holding
appears questionable in view of the fact that the Navy as an executive
department possesses administrative rather than quasi-legislative powers.' 3
Hence, its administrative interpretations are no more than mere official
expressions of opinion as to the legislative intent and do not represent
the exercise of delegated legislative power within the prescribed limits of
an intelligible standard. Moreover, the reenactment and amendment of
pertinent sections of the statute without alteration of the scope of court-
martial jurisdiction 14 must be given great weight in the light of Supreme
6. Articles for the Government of the Navy (hereafter referred to as AGN)
REV. STAT. § 1624 (1875), 34 U. S. C. § 1200 (1946).
7. "The orders, regulations, and instructions issued by the Secretary of the Navy
prior to July 14, 1862, with such alterations as he may have since adopted, with the ap-
proval of the President, shall be recognized as the regulations of the Navy, subject to
alterations adopted in the same manner." REv. STAT. § 1547 (1875), 34 U. S. C. § 591
(1946).
8. Sec. 14 (Eleventh) AGN, supra note 6 after defining certain offenses involving
fraud, contains a saving clause which specifically retains military jurisdiction over
persons accused of such offenses after they have been separated from the service. Sim-
ilar provisions are embodied in Article of War 94. While none of the offenses in-
volved in the instant case is contained in this section, both majority and minority dis-
cuss the implications of this saving clause with respect to persons who have re-entered
the naval service.
9. This rule as stated in the ARmuy's MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 8, paragraph
10 (1928) was followed by the Navy. See WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECE-
DENTS 93 (1920) ; Court-Martial Order 22 at 7 (1917) ; Court-Martial Order 12 at 11
(1921); Court-Martial Order 1 at 9 (1926); Court-Martial Order 12 at 7 (1929).
The Army has continued to adhere to this traditional rule.
10. Relator's first contention that as a prisoner of war in the Philippine Islands
he was not subject to the jurisdiction of courts-martial had been overruled by the
District Court; this ruling was affirmed here without comment.
11. Sec. 334 of NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS (1937) (issued "for the government
of all persons attached to the naval service") states, ". . . Similarly, the Navy De-
partment has passed cases as legal in which enlisted men have been convicted by
court-martial of offenses committed in a previous enlistment although such offenses
were not provided for in article 14, A. G. N." The Navy contended that this section
was intended to announce to the service the rule that Naval Courts had jurisdiction
over personnel in respect of offenses committed in previous enlistments. They also
said that NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS was a regulation having the force of law and so
it was construed by Court-Martial Order 7 at 42 (1938) as approved by the Secretary.
It is interesting to note that there is no reference to Naval Courts and Boards in the
opinion of the District Court, supra note 1.
12. They realized, however, that the legislative limits could not be changed.
13. See REv. STAT. § 158 (1875), 5 U. S. C. § 1 (1946) ; REv. STAT. § 161 (1875),
5 U. S. C. § 22 (1946) ; United States v. George, 228 U. S. 14 (1913).
14. Sec. 14 (Eleventh) AGN, supra notes 6 and 8, originally enacted in 12 STAT.
696, 697 (1863) ; re-enacted in its present form in 1909. Judge Frank says in note 15
to his dissenting opinion in the instant case at 510, ". . . before the alleged change
of the Navy's interpretation, 29 of the Navy Articles were amended at least once;
these amendments were made in numerous statutes from 1874 to 1925; none of these
amendments indicated any intention to reject the interpretation here in question."
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Court pronouncements to the effect that long standing administrative in-
terpretations are to be read into a statute upon its re-enactment since Con-
gressional silence indicates approval of the construction which formerly
obtained.15 Thus, since the authority of the Navy to try the relator under
the rule established by its second interpretation is, at best, questionable,
it would seem that the judgment of the trial court should have been
affirmed, for doubts in a case involving personal liberty should be resolved
in favor of the individual.
Before the instant case, civil adjudications relating to the jurisdiction
of courts-martial 16 constituted, on the whole, the best indicia of the exact
limits of such jurisdiction. Standing in sharp contrast to this the result
reached here impliedly sanctions flexible jurisdictional lines which may be
adjusted from time to time through administrative interpretations. While
it cannot be gainsaid that changing policies and new conditions may require
alteration of the traditional rules, such changes, especially when they may
affect fundamental civil liberties, should come from the legislative rather
than the executive branch of the government.
17
Habeas Corpus-Exhaustion of Remedies Held To Require
Timely Appeal-Jurisdiction of Trial Court Once Litigated Fore-
closed to Collateral Attack-Relator was adjudged in contempt, fined
$22,000 and imprisoned until the fine should be paid, for answering
evasively certain questions put to him by a master appointed by the dis-
trict court to aid in the discovery of assets of a partnership of which
relator was a member and for which a receiver had been appointed. The
district court had previously held 1 that it had jurisdiction of the person
and of the subject matter when relator raised those issues 2 at the time
the receiver was appointed. Relator failed to appeal the court's decision
and, when he subsequently attempted to appeal the later order requiring
him to give testimony before the master, the circuit court held that order
not appealable on the ground that it was interlocutory. After having been
adjudged in contempt, the relator filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus which was denied by the district court without opinion. On appeal,
the circuit court, affirming the judgment, held that habeas corpus would
not serve as a substitute for appeal (the order appointing the receiver
15. United States v. Falk & Brother, 204 U. S. 143, 152 (1907) states in effect
that when a statute is interpreted and interpretation applied and Congress subsequently
re-enacts with other changes the interpretation stands as meaning of statute. The
dissent cites with approval New York, N. H. & H. R. R. v. ICC, 200 U. S. 361, 401-2
(1906) and Copper Queen Mining Co. v. Arizona Board, 206 U. S. 474, 479 (1907).
16. United States ex rel. Viscardi v. MacDonald, 265 Fed. 695 (E. D. N. Y.
1920) ; Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509 (1878). But cf. Ex parte Joly, 290 Fed.
858 (S. D. N. Y. 1922). For a full review of these cases see 36 GEO. L. J. 445 (1948).
17. The divergency between the Army and Navy rulings, supra notes 9 and 11,
emphasizes the need for uniform legislative treatment if a change is desired.
1. 71 F. Supp. 103 (S. D. N. Y. 1947).
2. The complaint alleged that relator resided in New York and Menashe (appel-
lee) in the territory of Hawaii. Diversity of citizenship is present only if the 1940
amendment, 54 STAT. 143 (1940), 28 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1946), to the judicial code,
36 STAT. 1091 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §41(1) (1946), is valid. The amendment has been
declared unconstitutional in two circuits; Central States Co-ops. v. Watson Bros.
Transportation Co., 165 F. 2d 392 (7th Cir. 1947) ; National Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 165 F. 2d 531 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. granted, 333 U. S. 860
(1948) ; see Note, 55 YAiE L. J. 600, 603 (1946).
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having been appealable),3 and moreover collateral attack on the jurisdic-
tion of the trial court was foreclosed inasmuch as the question had been
once litigated. United States ex rel. Sutton v. Mulcahy et al. (Menashe,
Impleaded Appellee), 169 F. 2d 94 (2d Cir. 1948). 4
"That habeas corpus cannot be made to do service for an appeal is a
well worn formula" 5 but like most legal generalizations it is of little prac-
tical value in the solution of a problem posed by a given set of operative
facts. Where the right to appeal is still open and the appeal not useless,
the application of the rule is desirable in the interest of systematic judicial
administration, and it is so applied. 6 A more difficult case is presented,
however, where a once-possible appeal was not taken, and is now fore-
closed. Through an understandable error 7 in legal strategy, the relator
in the instant case was unable to litigate the jurisdiction of the court which
ordered his commitment, solely because he failed to raise timely objection
to a previous order to which he presumably had no more than nominal
objection," even though the commitment was not based on a violation of
such previous appealable order. In Sunal v. Large,9 cited by the circuit
court in the instant case, and, with one exception,'" the only Supreme
Court case discussing the precise point, the Court held that habeas corpus
was not available where relator had not made use of an appellate remedy
no longer available. The writ, however, was based on an error of law
which did not fall within the traditional area of habeas corpus inquiry, the
jurisdiction of the court,:" and no extenuating circumstances could be
found to justify the failure to take an appeal.' 2 There are indications in
the opinion that had the error been "jurisdictional," different considera-
tions would apply and the result might have been the granting of the writ.13
The Court, moreover, seemed to fear that a different result on the facts of
the Sunal case might open the door to interminable litigation in criminal
cases.14  That the rule of the Sunal case is not absolute is further illus-
trated by the recent Supreme Court decision in Wade v. Mayo,15 where
the court held that failure to apply to the Supreme Court for certiorari to
the highest state court does not absolutely bar the exercise of the federal
district court's discretion to entertain a petition for habeas corpus, even
though certiorari, in cases where it is available, is ordinarily considered
necessary before resort is had to habeas corpus.
3. 36 STAT. 1134 (1911), as amended, 28 U. S. C. §227 (1946).
4. Petition for writ of certiorari now before the Supreme Court, Docket No. 178
(October Term, 1948).
5. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 184
(1947).
6. Urghart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179 (1907); Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U. S. 184
(1899) ; Note, 35 COL. L. REv. 404, 414 (1935); 40 COL. L. REv. 535, 537 (1940).
7. It is at least understandable that the relator did not expect nor forsee a heavy
fine and imprisonment when he consented to the judgment appointing a receiver. See
Judge Frank, dissenting, instant case, 99.
8. See Judge Frank, dissenting, instant case, 99.
9. 332 U. S. 174 (1947).
10. Goto v. Lane, 265 U. S. 393 (1924) (Equities in the case were not with peti-
tioner and habeas corpus was denied. The petition was based on the use of the dis-
junctive "or" instead of the conjunctive "and" in an indictment for an infamous crime);
40 COL. L. Rv. 535, 537 (1940).
11. 332 U. S. 174, 181 (1947).
12. Ibid.
13. Id. at 182.
14. Ibid.
15. 334 U. S. 672, 680 (1948).
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The court, in the instant case, also applied the doctrine of the Stoll 16
and Chicot County 17 cases, to the effect that a collateral attack will not
lie against a court's jurisdiction if that question has been litigated or could
have been litigated in the original proceedings. Neither decision involved
habeas corpus, and in each, strong policy considerations in favor of the
peaceful, prompt and conclusive determination of civil suits, and the pro-
giotion of certainty in commercial enterprise were present. The policy and
purposes underlying habeas corpus are entirely different; for considera-
ti'ons of economy of judicial time, and maintenance of procedural forms,
important as they are, pale into comparative insignificance when measured
against the interest in the preservation of human liberty.' 8 Here too, the
Supreme Court, in Kalb v. Feurstein,'9 has indicated that the rules of the
Stoll and Chicot County cases are not unyielding when they collide with
underlying policies against their application.20
While the Supreme Court, to dispose of unworthy and frivolous
petitions, has adopted the rule that the "Freedom Writ" 21 will not serve
as a substitute for appeal, it has also said that the rule is to be applied in
the discretion of the court and has evolved the long standing doctrine of
"exceptional circumstances." 22 Under that doctrine the writ may be
allowed without consideration of the availability or adequacy of relief by
the appellate route. The term "exceptional circumstances" is not rigidly
defined by the cases, nor should it be; for "this last resort for human
liberty cannot yield when the choice is between tolerating its wrongful
deprivation and maintaining the systematists art." 23 A determination
whether the writ is, in fact, sought as a substitute for an appeal, should,
in a practical view of the administration of justice 24 be an important
element in deciding if a case such as the instant one is to be held to involve
"exceptional circumstances." Such a rule would not be equivalent to
expanding habeas corpus into virtually an alternate method of appeal in
imprisonment cases; for there would be few prisoners foolhardy enough
to forgo the broad scope of review available by appeal for the comparatively
narrow review 25 available in habeas corpus proceedings, and in addition
run the risk of a possible adverse application of the discretion rule.
16. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938); 6 U. OF CL L. REv. 293 (1939)
(Bankruptcy court's adjudication that it had jurisdiction to cancel a guaranty of debt-
or's bond held immune from collateral attack in state court).
17. Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940);
1 WAsH. & LE L. REv. 275 (1940) (Collateral attack was not permitted upon a judg-
ment approving a municipal debt reorganization plan where at a later date the statute
under which the proceeding was taken was declared unconstitutional).
18. See Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Sunal v. Large, supra at 189; Note,
40 COL. L. REV. 1006, 1028 (1940).
19. 308 U. S. 433 (1940) (In an action under the Frazier-Lemke Act, passed to
aid in the rehabilitation of distressed farmers, collateral attack by a farmer of an action
involving a mortgage foreclosure was permitted even though the question of jurisdic-
tion could have been litigated in the original action).
20. Note, 40 CoL. L. REv. 1006, 1029 (1940).
21. Note, 61 HA.v. L. REv. 657 (1948).
22. Bowen v. Johnson, 306 U. S. 19, 27 (1939); Notes, 61 HAtv. L. REv. 657
(1948) ; 35 COL. L. REv. 404 (1935).
23. See Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Sunal v. Large, supra at 189.
24. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Sunal v. Large, upra at 184.
25. Sunal v. Large, supra 179; Note, 61 H~Av. L. REv. 657 (1948).
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Labor Law-Parent Union Denied Funds of Seceding Local-
The International Union of Brewery Workers, by vote of a majority of*
its locals, not including Local No. 2, affiliated with the C. I. 0. Shortly
thereafter, Local No. 2, with one dissenting vote, withdrew from the
International to affiliate with the A. F. L. Thereupon, the International
sued to establish its right to the Local's funds. Holding that the funds
were a trust for the benefit of the individual members of the Local, and
that the International therefore had no right to them, the court dismissed
the bill. International Union v. Becherer, 61 A. 2d 16 (N. J. Eq. 1948).
The typical union charter provides that upon severance of relations
between the parent union and the local the funds of the local shall revert
to the parent.' Most courts enforce such clauses, 2 treating the charter as
a contract between the local and the parent.3  However, forfeiture clauses
are strictly construed, and may not be given effect where a local's charter
is revoked, especially if the requisite procedures were not followed.4
Where the forfeiture clause is not enforced, title to the funds of a seceding
local is determined by the percentage of the local's members supporting
its action,5 the extent to which the local's existence is dependent upon the
national, 6 and the purpose for which the funds were raised. Of these, the
purpose for which the funds were raised is the predominant factor; the
courts label them a trust for that purpose.7 If the purpose, as set forth
in the constitution and charter, is clearly inseparable from that of the
parent union, the seceding group has no right to the funds; 8 but if the
purpose is primarily local the funds remain with the local group even
though it secedes.9 The same considerations should apply where there
is no forfeiture clause, as in the instant case, with the funds remaining
in the local unless the court finds an agreement, express or implied, to
devote them to the general purposes of the union.' 0
Inasmuch as the constitution and charter in the instant case ap-
parently contained no express provision that the funds were to be used
1. Note, Intra-Union Disputes Concerning Union Funds, 47 YALE L. J. 483, 484
(1938) ; Note, Funds of Unincorporated Labor UnloM, U. OF PA. L. REv. 985, 990
(1939).
2. Brown v. Hook, 79 Cal. App. 781, 180 P. 2d 982 (1947) ; Hermione Lodge v.
Grand Lodge, 248 Ala. 473, 28 So. 2d 166 (1946) ; Wolchok v. Durst, 66 N. Y. S. 2d
295 (1946) ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Brotherhood, 120 N. J. Eq. 346, 184 Atl. 832
(1936). Since the courts borrow freely from the law of beneficial associations to set-
tle union cases, some of the cases herein cited involve such associations rather than
unions.
3. Killeen v. International Alliance, 190 P. 2d 30 (Cal. 1948) ; Martin v. United
Slate Roofers, 56 A. 2d 28 (Md. 1947) ; Hogan v. Williams, 185 Misc. 336, 55 N. Y.
S. 2d 904 (1945) ; Quinn v. Marvin, 168 Ore. 52, 120 P. 2d 227 (1941).
4. Reichert v. United Brotherhood, 14 N. J. Misc. 106, 183 Atl. 728 (1936) ; see
also Grand Court v. Court Germania, 192 Mich. 380, 158 N. W. 832 (1916).
5. Donovan v. Danielson, 271 Mass. 267, 171 N. E. 823 (1930) ; see Di Silvestro
v. Grand Lodge, 222 N. Y. Supp. 203, 215 (1927).
6. Minor v. Grand Lodge, 62 Tex. Civ. 100, 130 S. W. 893 (1910).
7. Grand Court v. Hodel, 74 Wash. 314, 133 Pac. 438 (1913) ; Schubert Lodge
v. Schubert Kranken, 56 N. J. Eq. 78, 38 At. 341 (1897).
8. Minor v. Grand Lodge, supra; Centralia Labor Ass'n v. O'Day, 139 Wash. 331,
246 Pac. 930 (1926).
9. Grand Court v. Court Germania, supra, where sick benefit fund was held a
trust for local purposes.
10. Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal. App. 126, 269 Pac. 455 (1928); State Council v.
Enterprise Council, 75 N. J. Eq. 245, 72 Atl. 19 (1909) ; State Council v. Emery, 219
Pa. 461, 68 Atl. 1023 (1908). In these cases forfeiture clauses were held inapplicable,
and funds raised for sick benefits were held to be trust for local purposes.
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for general union purposes, but merely that a certain portion of the local's
dues were to be remitted regularly to the parent," the decision is correct
unless an implied agreement can be found. If it can reasonably be in-
ferred that by the very fact of affiliation with a national union a local
impliedly agrees to devote all of its resources to the general union cause,
it might well be said that the funds are impressed with a trust for that
purpose. In that event the court would grant the funds to the party best
able to fulfill the trust, in this case the parent union. But it should not
be inferred that a local agrees to surrender any greater rights in its funds
than is necessary to attain its end, namely, increased bargaining power.
That this is satisfactorily attained by merely giving the parent a portion
of the local's dues is evidenced by the substantial treasuries of national
unions.. 2 In reaching its conclusion in the instant case the court empha-
sized that the local was not dependent upon the national for its existence.
However, the degree of affiliation is merely evidence of the extent to which
the local's funds have been devoted to the national's purposes. Hence,
in the absence of an express constitutional provision giving the parent a
right to the local's funds, and in view of the unreasonableness of inferring
such provision from the mere fact of affiliation, the court properly denied
the International any title to the seceding local's property.13  That such a
decision may tend to weaken the position of national unions is by no means
certain, since those few not having a forfeiture clause may either adopt
one or insert in the charter an appropriate clause devoting the locals' funds
irrevocably to national purposes.
Libel and Slander-Liability of Estate and Executor for Publi-
cation of a Libel Contained in Will-Plaintiff's testatrix included in
her will certain libelous statements concerning plaintiff. In a suit for
damages, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, affirming the Common
Pleas Circuit Court, held unanimously that neither the estate nor the
executor was liable.' Carver v. Morrow et al., 48 S. E. 2d 814 (1948).
The problem of libelous statements in a will has arisen only a few
times 2 prior to the instant case. The ancient maxim,3 "actio personalis
11. Instant case at 20.
12. BARBASH, LABOR UNIONS IN AcTIoN, 48 (1948); U. M. W. FiNANcIAL RE-
PORT, 1 LAB. REL. REP. 587 (1938).
13. Had a substantial minority remained loyal to the International, resulting in a
dispute over the funds between two local factions, it is unlikely that the seceding fac-
tion would have won. Low v. Harris, 90 F. 2d 783 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Brownfield v.
Simon, 94 Misc. 720, 158 N. Y. Supp. 187 (1916). But cf. Schweitzer v. Schneider,
86 N. J. Eq. 88, 97 Atl. 159 (1916).
1. The court adopted per curiam the decision of the lower court.
2. In Matter of Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 733 (Orph. Ct. 1901) (estate
liable; question of executor's personal liability did not arise); Harris v. Nashville
Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584 (1913) (estate liable, executor not liable) ;
Nagle v. Nagle, 16 Pa. D. & C. 346 (C. P. Erie Co. 1930) [judgment n. o. v. for estate
affirmed on separate grounds, with assumption that the action survived testator's death,
316 Pa. 507, 175 At. 487 (1934)]; Citizens' and Southern Nat. Bank v. Hendricks,
176 Ga. 692, 168 S. E. 313 (1933) (neither estate nor executor liable); Brown v.
Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (estate liable, executor not
liable).
3. The maxim seems to have been venerated more for its age than for its worth.
See Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 581, 582, 583, 162 S. W. 584, 586, 587
(1913).
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moritur cure persona," under which historically all personal actions abated,
was whittled down by exceptions at common law, 4 and now has been
practically vitiated by survival statutes. Where survival statutes have
been involved in the cases, they have generally excluded libel and slander
from the causes of action that survive, either expressly 5 or by implica-
tion.6 Nevertheless, the tendency has been to regard libel by publication
in a will as an aggravated form of the tort," which justifies flying in the
face of express statutory language 8 or engaging in dialectics 9 to allow
recovery against the estate.
Efforts to reach the executor personally for publication of the libel,
or as decedent's agent therefor, have been unsuccessful; 1o the courts have
realized that eventually someone will have to probate the will, as required
by law, and that therefore no liability can attach to publication in this
manner. Refusal to hold the executor personally liable has been discussed
in terms of privilege,11 duty of the executor to probate the will,' 2 and
4. Ibid.
5. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8694 (Williams, 1934) : No actions shall abate save those
"for wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff." PA. LAws, Act of Feb. 24,
1834, P. L. 73, § 28: executors may sue and be sued in any action ". . . except
actions for libel and slander. . . ." Subsequent to the Gallagher case, supra note 2,
this section of the act was repealed by the Fiduciaries Act, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20,
§ 771 (Purdon, 1939), but libel and slander still expressly abate, by the terms of the
new section.
6. GA. CODE § 3-505 (1933) : "No action for a tort shall abate by the death of
either party where the wrongdoer received any benefit from the tort complained of;
nor shall any action for the recovery of damages for homicide, injury to the person,
or injury to property abate by the death of either party. . ." So. CAR CoDE § 419
(1942): "... causes of action for . . . any and all injuries . . . to the per-
son . . . shall survive."
The New York survival statute [N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 118 (McKinney, 1939)]
has been held to include actions for libel. See Brown v. Mack, supra note 2. Further,
a report of the Law Revision Commission says, of a proposed clarifying amendment
thereto, "Its purpose is to make clear that under section 118 of the Decedent Estate
Law an action against an executor or administrator, for injury to the person .
is not defeated because the tort-feasor died before the occurrence of such injuries. . .';
REPORT, N. Y. Comm. o N LAW REvisION, REcOmMENDATIONS AND STuDIEs, p. 777
(1942); Leg. Doc. No. 65(N) (1942).
7. See Gallagher's Estate, mpra note 2, at 736. "A wise policy of the law dis-
courages actions which . . . leave no scars . . . but gives compensation through
actions in the nature of libel for substantial injuries.
"The alleged libel here differs in essential respects from libels of the common
stamp. It was written in cold blood . . . in a public record which would be a per-
petual reminder of the charge."
8. See note 5, supra.
9. See Gallagher's Estate, supra note 2, at 736: "But the terms of the rule include
only rights of action which existed at the death . . . for a right cannot be extin-
guished which does not exist." Also, Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573,
580, 581, 162 S. W. 584, 586 (1913) : "This right of action arose after [decedent's]
death, and could not have been buried with him."
10. See cases cited note 2, supra. In no case was the executor held personally
liable.
11. Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 381, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 910, 923 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
12. Instant case at 816; Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 579, 162
S. W. 584, 585 (1913) ; Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 378, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 910, 920
(1945).
Moreover, suppression of a will is made criminal. N. Y. PENAL LAw § 2052
(McKinney, 1939) ; So. CAR. CODE §§ 8946, 8947 (1942) ; TENN. CoDE ANN. § 10,942
(Williams, 1934).
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agency law,13 but whatever the theory, the immunity seems eminently
sensible.1
4
South Carolina, having no precedent of its own, adopted the less-
favored view of its neighbor, Georgia, and invoked the maxim, "actio
personalis moritur cur persona," to deny recovery against the estate.15
While logically sound in the light of the maxim and the particular survival
statute involved, one cannot sympathize with the result. A more per-
petual damage to character can hardly be imagined than to have the state-
ments a matter of public record, and necessarily read every time real estate
descending under the will is conveyed. Where other permanent media of
publication are involved, the problem is different; for a libel published
in a newspaper, for example, the injured party has recourse at least to the
publisher, and the wrong is thus redressed even if the author dies; 16 but
in case of publication by will, the executor is immune, and logically so.
Nevertheless, the artificial distinction that the cause of action survives
because a right which arises after death cannot be extinguished by death,' 7
is not convincing, unless one feels that the end justifies the means because
of the gross injustice otherwise done to the plaintiff. There appears to be
no sound reason why actions for libel should abate, while other actions,
such as those for bodily injury, survive.' 8 Statutory revision to include
libel in those causes of action which survive, whether the libel occur
before or after death of the author, seems to be called for.
Limitation of Actions-Single Publication Doctrine in Libel Ac-
tions Extended to Books-Plaintiffs were allegedly libeled in a book
published by defendants in November, 1941. The last edition' of the
book was printed in December, 1943, distribution by the publishers con-
tinuing until the commencement of this action on July 2, 1946. Damages
were sought for injuries caused by books distributed during the preceding
year. The New York Court of Appeals held that the action was barred
13. Instant case at 817.
14. Courts have suggested, however, that the executor should petition the court
to delete libelous matter from the will before probate, so as at least to reduce the area
of publication. This appears to be the English practice, although no cases involving
liability for libel in a will have arisen there. See, e. g., In Goods of White, [1914] P.
153.
American courts have generally favored this practice [Payne's Estate, 160 Misc.
224, 290 N. Y. Supp. 407 (Surr. Ct. 1936)], but have experienced difficulty where the
defamatory statements are part of a dispositive clause [In re Meyer, 72 Misc. Rep.
566. 131 N. Y. Supp. 27 (Surr. Ct. 1911)].
15. The executor was held to be not personally liable, on the theory that he was
an agency of the law to probate the will. Instant case at 817.
16. E. g., Peterson v. Cleaver, 105 Neb. 438, 181 N. W. 187 (1920) (individual
author of libel and newspaper carrying it held together liable for defamatory state-
ments published therein).
17. See note 9, supra.
18. It has been suggested that actions for libel are in the nature of personal re-
venge on the author, carried out under the auspices of the courts, and that the dam-
ages awarded are really more a legal way of wreaking revenge than a recompense to
the plaintiff for any measurable financial loss. Perhaps it was this feeling that in-
fluenced the Georgia and South Carolina courts in their decision that the action abated.
1. There were six other printings of the book between November, 1941 and De-
cember, 1943.
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by the one-year Statute of Limitations.2  Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons,
298 N. Y. 119, 81 N. E. 2d 45 (1948).
At common law each time a libel was brought to the attention of a
third person a new publication was effected. Each publication constituted
a fresh tort giving rise to a new cause of action for which the Statute of
Limitations had to run.3 Practical appraisal of the exigencies of large
scale publication of newspapers led to the development of the "single pub-
lication" rule, a doctrine which treated the collective process of writing,
printing and distributing a libel in a voluminous supply of newspapers as
giving rise to a single cause of action.4 Departure from the common law
was not unanimous however, 5 because of a reluctance to accept a doctrine
which allows a publisher to continue disseminating a libel with impunity
by pleading his original wrong. Nevertheless, the weight of authority
has not only affirmed 6 but considerably expanded this doctrine. 7 It has
progressed from a "rule of convenience" 8 to a doctrine "recommended
both by logic and public policy." 9
The instant case extends the single publication rule to the printing
of an allegedly libelous book. Plaintiff sought to distinguish books 1o
from periodicals on the ground that they grow in popularity and effective-
ness; that yesterday's newspapers are dead but a book is, and is intended
to be, sold throughout the years. In saying that any other decision would
thwart the purpose of the legislature to bar "completely and forever" stale
claims," the court did not give a reason why the cause of action accrued
2. N. Y. CIVIL Pl~c. ACT § 51(3), as ametoted by Laws of 1936, c. 327, § 2. The
time within which an action for libel or slander must be brought varies materially in
the different states, but periods are uniformly short ranging from six months to two
years. 33 Am. JUR., LIBEL AND SLANDER § 225 (1941).
3. Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849); RE-
STATEMENTS, TORTS, § 578, comment b (1938) ; ODGERS, LIBEL AND SLANDER 568 (4th
ed. 1905).
4. Credit for formulation of this rule has been given to Alabama and to New
York. Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921);
Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 640 (4th Dep't
1938), af'd, 279 N. Y. 716, 20 N. E. 2d 21 (1939).
5. Hartmann v. American News Co., 69 F. Supp. 736 (W. D. Wis. 1947) ; Win-
rod v. McFadden Publishing Co., 62 F. Supp. 249 (N. D. Ill. 1945); Holden v.
American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (E. D. Wash. 1943); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lar-
son, 138 Tex. 434, 160 S. W. 2d 246 (1942) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 578, comment b
(1938).
6. Hartmann v. Time, 166 F. 2d 127 (3d Cir. 1948) ; Backus v. Look, 39 F. Supp.
662 (S. D. N. Y. 1941) ; Cannon v. Time, 39 F. Supp. 660 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Age-
Herald Pub. Co. v. Huddleston, supr note 4; Forman v. Miss. Pub. Co., 195 Miss.
90, 14 So. 2d 344 (1943) ; Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, supra note 4.
7. Held not to be republications: replacement copies sent to subscribers whose
copies were damaged in transit, Cannon v. Time, szipra note 6; purchase of specified
back issues, Means v. McFadden Pub., 25 F. Supp. 933 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); peri-
odicals bound in volume for public library use, Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers,
supra note 4. But see Winrod v. McFadden Pub., supra note 5.
8. Winrod v. McFadden Pub., supra note 5 at 250; Wolfson v. Syracuse News-
papers, supra note 4 (dissenting opinion).
9. "The so-called 'single publication' rule, is the preferable one and is recom-
mended by both logic and public policy. Public policy must regard the freedom of
the press and while the law must exact penalties for libel the instruments of free and
effective expression, newspapers and magazines which are published on a nation-
wide basis, should not be subjected to the harassment of repeated law suits." Hart-
mann v. Time, supra note 6.
10. Plaintiff found support with three dissenting judges. Instant case at 127.
11. The short length of the statute is particularly significant. See also note 9,
supra.
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at the time of printing rather than at the time of sale. Instead they merely
reaffirmed the doctrine and extended it to books.
The court still apparently considers reprinting a publication which will
create a new cause of action.' 2  Since it is the dissemination to a third
party which constitutes the publication of a libel,13 it seems unrealistic to
make this distinction merely because the defamatory article rolled off the
presses a second time.' 4 However, although this court failed to articulate
its reasons, they have arrived at an extremely practical solution. Pub-
lishers would rarely print in advance more copies of a book than would
be sold within a reasonable length of time. The inequitable situations
envisaged by the dissenters 15 would require reprintings thus laying the
publisher open to a new suit. Such a solution upholds the policy of the
Statute of Limitations but is of sufficient deterrent force to prevent con-
tinued, deliberate calumniation.
Statutes-Affidavits of Individual Legislator and Counsel Held
Admissable as Aid to Interpretation-In an action involving the in-
terpretation of a federal statute, affidavits of a member of Congress and
of counsel to the RFC with reference to their understanding of Con-
gressional intent in adopting the law were admitted as competent cor-
roboratory testimony. United States v. Howell Electric Motors Co., 78
F. Supp. 627 (E. D. Mich. 1948).1
The realization that a construction of a statute derived from a study
of its external history is much more dependable than one gleaned from
the words alone,2 has led courts in the exercise of their duty to ascertain
and give effect to legislative intent,3 to make increasing use of materials
12. Instant case at 125; Mack, Miller Candle Co. v. The Macmillan Co., 239
App. Div. 738, 269 N. Y. Supp. 33 (4th Dep't 1934), aff'd, 266 N. Y. 489, 195 N. E.
167 (1934) ; Cook v. Connors, 215 N. Y. 175, 109 N. E. 78 (1915).
13. RESTATEE NT, TORTS, § 577 (1938) ; NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL 219 (4th
ed. 1924).
14. An opinion by a recent Illinois Federal Court suggests a possible solution. Un-
impressed by the distinction drawn between resale and reprinting, yet recognizing that
mass dissemination of printed matter requires a modification of the common law, the
court would make any act by the publisher which would bring libel to the attention of
a third person a republication; but he would exclude acts done by persons not associ-
ated directly with the publisher. In any case, damages would be limited to those that
were suffered within the statutory period. Winrod v. McFadden Pub., mpra note 4.
Commented on in 24 CHI-KENT Rnv. 278 (1948).
15. For example, an extremely harsh case would result where a limited number
of books were sold during its first year in print but tremendous sales took place there-
after.
1. The court held that the July 1, 1943 amendment to the Renegotiation Act extends
the power to subsidiaries of RFC to renegotiate, retroactively, its contracts or sub-
contracts upon which final payment has not been made prior to April 28, 1942. 56
STAT. 245 (1942), as amended, 57 STAT. 348, 50 U. S. C. § 1191(a) (1946).
2. De Sloov~re, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 527, 532 (1940).
3. See United States v. C. I. 0., 335 U. S. 106, 112 (1948) ; United States v. Amer-
ican Trucking Assoc., 310 U. S. 534, 542; Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 207 (1917). But, in an address before the American Law Institute, re-
printed in 34 A. B. A. J. 535, 538 (1948), Mr. Justice Jackson said, "And, after all.
should a statute mean to a court what was in the minds but not put into the words of
the men behind it, or should it mean what its language reasonably conveys to those
who are expected to obey it?" For a discussion of the reality of legislative intent, see
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863 (1930) ; Landis, A Note on
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 886 (1930).
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extrinsic to the words of the act.4 The "Plain Meaning" rule 5. is disre-
garded in judicial practice at least as often as it is applied.
6 It seems that
no rule of law excludes available aids which are relevant 7 in determining
the scope of the law as intended by the legislature as an entity.8 To resort,
however, to the views of individuals, even of legislators, subsequent to the
enactment of the law would necessitate passing on the credibility of the
witnesses and make the character of the law depend upon varying and
conflicting statements which would involve the interpretation of the law
in endless confusion and uncertainty. 9 The element of oneness and agree-
ment found in certain legislative materials, admitted for specific purposes,19
is wholly lacking when an individual testifies as to what the majority
intended. In recognition of the unreliability of such testimony the courts
have consistently refused to admit this type of evidence. 1
While the opinions of the individuals in the instant case might pos-
sibly be instructive, the introduction of this new source of information
does little to aid the court in performing its function. On the contrary
it assumes something most difficult to comprehend; that such testimony
expresses the intent of several hundred members of Congress. The court's
tacit assumption that the affidavits were relevant is utterly without sup-
port.' 2  It is submitted that this novel holding will receive very little
support; for the evidence was clearly extraneous.
4. Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IowA L. REv. 737 (1940). On
the history of a statute as an aid, see Miller, The Value of Legislative History of Fed-
eral Statutes, 73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 158 (1925) ; Nutting, The Relevance of Legisla-
tive Intention Established by Extrinsic Evidence, 20 B. U. L. REv. 601 (1940). It
appears that few states have legislative materials recorded so as to provide the state
courts with various sources of information, in contrast with materials which are avail-
able to federal courts.
5. See United States v. Mo. Pac. R. R., 278 U. S. 269, 278 (1929). "But where
the language of the enactment is clear and construction according to its terms does
not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the words employed are to be taken
as the final expression of the meaning intended."
6. Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of
Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U. L. Q. 2, 17 (1939).
7. See, e. .q., United States v. American Trucking Assoc., 310 U. S. 534, 544
(1940); United States v. Dickerson, 310 U. S. 554, 562 (1940); Boston Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 41, 48 (1928).
8. See, e. g., United States v. C. I. 0., 335 U. S. 106, 112 (1938) ; Detroit Edison
Co. v. State, 320 Mich. 506, 31 N. W. 2d 809 (1948) ; People v. Maxhausen, 204 Mich.
559, 171 N. W. 557, 562 (1919).
9. See Tallevast v. Kasminski, 146 S. C. 225, 235, 143 S. E. 796, 799 (1928).
10. E. g., Wright v. Vinton Branch of The Mt. Trust Bank, 300 U. S. 440, 459,
463 (1937) (statements by member of committee in charge of the bill admitted to show
common agreement) ; Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643, 650
(1931) (statements made during debate showed common agreement) ; Duplex Print-
ing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 475-477 (1921) (explanatory statements of
committeeman in charge of the bill on floor, considered in nature of supplemental com-
mittee reports); American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S. 468, 473
(1891) (statements by individuals as to problems confronting the legislature) ; see 2
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNsTRucTIoN § 5009 (3d ed., Horack, 1943) ; Jones, supra
note 4, at 743, where the author suggests that the use of such materials is justified on
the ground that committee intent is legislative intent.
11. E. g., Badeau v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 48 (1886) ; Wiseman v. Madison
Cadillac Co., 191 Ark. 1021, 88 S. W. 2d 1007 (1935) ; City of Spokane v. State, 198
Wash. 682, 89 P. 2d 826 (1939) ; Ocean Forest v. Woodside et al., 184 S. C. 428, 192
S. E. 413 (1937); see 2 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 10, § 5013; De Sloov6re,
supra note 2, at 542.
12. The court relied on the cases cited note 7 supra. It cannot be said that these
cases lay down the proposition that the affidavits in instant case are relevant. See
also the authorities cited note 12 supra.
